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In many industries it is quite common to observe ﬁrms delegating
the production of essential inputs to independent ventures jointly estab-
lished with competing rivals. The diﬀusion of this arrangement and the
favourable stance of competition authorities call for the assessment of the
social and private desirability of Input Production Joint Ventures (IPJV),
which represent a form of input production cooperation, not investigated
so far. IPJV can be seen as an intermediate organizational setting lying
between the two extremes of vertical integration and vertical separation.
Our investigation is based on an oligopoly model with horizontally dif-
ferentiated goods. We characterize the conditions under which IPJV is
privately optimal ﬁnding that ﬁrms’ incentives may be welfare detrimen-
tal. We also provide a rationale for the empirical relevance of IPJV both
in terms of its ability to survive and in terms of disengagement incentives.
JEL codes: L24, L42
Keywords:input production joint venture, horizontal diﬀerentiation,
oligopoly.





In many industries we observe ﬁrms which delegate the production of an essential
input to an independent venture carried out in cooperation with one (or more)
ﬁrm(s) competing in the downstream market for the ﬁnal good. Many examples
may be found in most sectors.
In the automotive, for instance, Ford and PSA produce and design diesel
engines in a speciﬁc joint venture; Ford and Fiat produce in a jointly owned
plant the KA and the 500 on the basis of many common inputs.
In the electronic industry Sony jointly produces with rival Sharp newest
liquid crystal displays.
In the media production, newspapers get rough news from press agencies
they jointly own, like Associated Press in U.S.A. and ANSA in Italy.
In the chemicals it is quite common for giant companies to jointly own plants
where ethylene and other basic components for plastics are manufactured, such
as in the recent agreement between Dow and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
(Hewitt, 2008). Many other industries display cases of joint ventures in up-
stream sections of production. A great portion of them are known and visible
even to the accidental observer.
Most of these joint ventures devoted to the manufacturing of an essential
input are autonomous companies owned and governed on an equal foot by del-
egates of ﬁrms operating and competing among each other in the Downstream
(D) section of the vertical chain of production.
We may term this arrangement as Input Production Joint Venture (IPJV).
It may be regarded as an intermediate organizational setting lying between
two extremes: Vertical Integration (VI), where the essential input is entirely
manufactured in-house and Vertical Separation (VS), where the intermediate
good is bought from external and independent ﬁrms operating in the Upstream
(U) section of the vertical chain of production. Industrial Organization (IO)
has so far considered VS, VI1 and partial VS,2 while the case of IPJV is studied
only in the management literature.3
The closest case so far analyzed in IO is the Research Joint Venture (RJV)
with a large and consolidated literature.4 A RJV is a pre-production choice,
based on the maximization of ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts. A IPJV requires an inde-
pendent input producer owned on an equal stake by D ﬁrms. The proﬁt of
the venture accrues ultimately to the D ﬁrms which own the IPJV which is a
particular case of Equity Joint Venture, as deﬁned by Hewitt (2008)5. From
1For a recent survey of most theoretical and empirical issues on vertical integration, see
Lafontaine and Slade (2007).
2The analysis of partial outsourcing can be found in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007), Shy
and Stenbacka (2005), Moretto and Rossini (2008).
3See for example Hewitt (2008) and the rich management literature surveyed on the subject.
4The seminal paper on R&D cooperation is d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) which was
then extended by, e.g, Kamien et al. (1992), and generalized by Amir et al. (2003) and
Lambertini and Rossini (2009).
5“An equity joint venture .....is a joint venture or alliance which has the following character-
istics, namely where (i) each party has an ownership interest in a jointly owned business, (ii)
2the market structure viewpoint this arrangement is a kind of partial collusion.
However, it does not seem to have given rise to much antitrust complain and
suit so far.
Here, we would like to start to ﬁll the gap in IO and analyze IPJV. Our aim
is to examine feasibility, private and/or social desirability of IPJV considering
also static uncertainty. A major problem we shall investigate is the stability of
this arrangement or, in other words, the incentives that ﬁrms have to disengage
or to join the plot of ﬁrms doing IPJV.
As said above the closest case to IPJV is provided by Research Joint Ven-
tures (RJV). As literature emphasizes RJV is able to raise industry proﬁts and,
in most cases, also social welfare.6 This result has produced a favorable stance
by the US Department of Justice and many other antitrust authorities. “RJVs
often provide procompetitive beneﬁts, such as sharing the substantial economic
risks involved in R&D, increasing economies of scale in R&D beyond what indi-
vidual ﬁrms could realize....The antitrust enforcement agencies also view most
RJVs as procompetitive and typically analyze them under the rule of reason
because of their potential to enable participants to develop more quickly or ef-
ﬁciently new or improved goods, services, or production processes. Under the
Competitors Collaboration Guidelines, the agencies will not ordinarily challenge
a RJV when there are three or more other independently controlled ﬁrms with
comparable research capabilities and incentives”.7 The case we are going to
analyze of IPJV could be classiﬁed, according to the received taxonomy, as a
subset of Production Joint Venture. Towards these arrangements the stance of
market authorities has been mostly benign due to their supposed procompetitive
eﬀect and to the beneﬁt consumers get: “Courts typically have analyzed true
production joint ventures under the rule of reason and generally have upheld
them”.8 The favorable stance of antitrust authorities should be also justiﬁed on
the basis of the instability of IPJV. As reported in the management literature,
almost one half of joint ventures end in a divorce (Hewitt, 2008, p.12).
In the ensuing pages we develop an oligopoly model with horizontally dif-
ferentiated goods and analyze IPJV comparing it with VI. We replicate some
canonical results on social superiority of VI, with linear pricing. However, we
show that IPJV (partial or complete, according to whether only some or all ﬁrms
in the market participate in the joint venture) is privately preferred to VI for
high enough levels of competition in the D product market. These novel results
obtain in the most unfavorable scenarios for IPJV, i.e., with zero ﬁxed costs.
A fortiori, they hold in the case of positive ﬁxed costs, since IPJV prevents
the jointly owned business has a distinct management structure in which each party directly
participates and (iii) the parties share the proﬁts (or losses) of the jointly owned business”.
(Hewitt, 2008, p. 96).
6The pionereeing contribution comes from Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) who found
that joint process research and development is welfare maximizing when ﬁrms compete à la
Cournot in the product market and in most cases of Bertand competition. The existence of
spillovers due to RJV are crucial to the result. For the most recent contributions on the topic,
which do not subvert the initial wisdom, see...
7Jacobson (2007) p. 447.
8Ibidem, p. 450.
3wasteful replication of ﬁxed costs. The private proﬁtability of IPJV goes up as
we move to more competitive market structures, i.e., as the number of ﬁrms
increases, as products become closer substitutes or as we go from Cournot to
Bertrand competition. The advantage of IPJV, when competition gets tougher,
is due to the fact that D ﬁrms are able to reap proﬁts in U (they jointly own)
so as to compensate for the reduced returns in D. In this sense D ﬁrms are not
afraid of competition in D. On the contrary, they may love it since they are
sheltered by their proﬁt “reserve” in U. As for the disengagement issue, we ﬁnd
that, when ﬁrms doing IPJV compete with vertically integrated rivals and prod-
uct market substitutability is low, there may be an incentive to leave the IPJV.
However, in some cases, incumbent vertically integrated ﬁrms may compensate
IPJV members to stay in and make IPJV stable.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section (2) we compare VI with
IPJV in a duopoly model, and we investigate the role of the degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, ﬁxed cost and the nature of competition in the D product
market in determining the private and social desirability of IPJV. In Section
(3), we extend our analysis to oligopoly and we consider partial IPJV, i.e., the
case in which only some of the ﬁrms in the market participate in the IPJV
while competing with other VI ﬁrms. In Section (4) we address the disengage-
ment question widely analyzed in the managerial literature on Joint Ventures
(Hewitt, 2008).Private incentives to disengage from the IPJV may in some cir-
cumstances dominate and make a IPJV unsustainable. Finally, in Section (5)
we analyze the relative preference of the diﬀerent vertical arrangements under
static uncertainty. Conclusions are given in Section (6).
2 A simple duopoly model
We begin with a simple model where there are two ﬁrms competing in the
downstream (D) market. Each ﬁrm i produces a diﬀerentiated product, qi sold
at price pi. The demand system is given by linear inverse demand schedules
pi = a − qi − bqj in the region of quantities where prices are positive. The
parameter a > 0 represents the market size; b ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of
substitutability between the two ﬁnal products (if b = 1, products are perfect
substitutes; if b = 0, products are specialized, i.e., perfectly diﬀerentiated). To
manufacture a ﬁnal good, each ﬁrm needs an essential input which is produced
either by the ﬁrm itself (VI) or by an independent U enterprise owned in equal
stakes by the two D ﬁrms (Input Production Joint Venture - IPJV). More pre-
cisely, for the input production the D ﬁrms set up an Equity Joint Venture
(Hewitt, 2008) whose proﬁts accrue ultimately to the D ﬁrms.
As it is customary in the literature on vertical relationships we assume that
one unit of input is embodied in each unit of output (perfect vertical comple-
mentarity). Input production requires a ﬁxed cost equal to f ≥ 0. Assume
that the marginal production cost of the input is constant and equal to z < a;
without loss of generality we set z = 0. Given the inverse demand system for
the ﬁnal goods Cournot competition leads to diﬀerent equilibria according to
4the vertical arrangements and the resulting U market structure. We examine
two distinct cases in turn.
The ﬁrst is based on VI: there are two (symmetric) ﬁrms each comprising a
U and a D activity. Their proﬁts are:
π1 = q1p1 − f
π2 = q2p2 − f
Quantity competition yields the customary symmetric equilibrium with the fol-















2 ≡ sV I (b). (1)
The second case is based on IPJV. The D ﬁrms jointly own on an equal
stake the independent U producer of the essential input, while competing among
themselves in the D section. Namely, both D ﬁrms get the input at the linear
price g set at the input stage by the (monopolistic) U producer in order to
maximize its proﬁt, πU = g (q1 + q2). The vertical interaction between U and
D is modelled as a two stage-game solved backwards, as it is customary in
literature adopting linear pricing.10 The input price is set at the monopoly





















































2 ≡ sJ (b). (2)
Comparing the equilibrium values of the two vertical arrangements we may
write the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Private and social relative eﬃciency of IPJV vs. VI.
a) Assume that input production does not require any ﬁxed cost, i.e. f = 0.
In a duopoly market, a producer of a ﬁnal good is indiﬀerent between verti-
cally integrating (VI) and participating to a IPJV as long as the ﬁnal goods are
homogeneous. In contrast, when the ﬁnal goods are horizontally diﬀerentiated,
downstream ﬁrms beneﬁt if they switch to vertical integration. As for consumers,
they always prefer vertical integration, which turns out to be Pareto superior.
b) Assume that the ﬁxed cost in U is f > 0 and let s = f/a2 be a relative
measure of ﬁxed cost vis à vis market size. It appears that IPJV is privately
preferred for large levels of s (high relative ﬁxed cost) and for increasing levels
of b (decreasing diﬀerentiation). Consumers’ preferences do not change with
respect to point a). Social welfare turns out to be always superior with VI.
Proof. a) Suppose ﬁrst that f = 0. Proﬁts’ comparison is:
ΠC
J − ΠC




As for the consumer surplus, it is higher under VI where the equilibrium price




2(b+2) > 0. Therefore, VI is privately and socially
preferred.
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￿








2 ≡ s(b) (3)
where s ≡ f/a2 is a relative measure of ﬁxed cost with respect to market size.
As for social welfare (SW) we have to compare the sums of consumer surplus and
industry proﬁts in the two cases (VI and IPJV). Straightforward calculations





below which the SW of VI is larger than the SW of IPJV. Therefore, in the
feasible set of parameters, VI is always socially preferred.
6For the sake of simplicity, we plot (1), (2), (3) and (4) in the plane (b,s) in
Figure 1 below. The upper solid line deﬁnes sJ (b) above which neither vertical
arrangement is feasible. The intermediate solid line deﬁnes sV I (b) below which
VI is feasible. The lower solid line deﬁnes s(b) above which IPJV is privately
preferred to VI, while below this line VI is preferred. The dashed line represents
the social welfare frontier, ￿ s(b) below which VI is socially preferred to IPJV.










FIGURE 1 Threshold lines for private and social ranking of JIPV vs VI.
Discussion. Whenever the ﬁxed cost of producing the essential input is
suﬃciently high, IPJV is privately more eﬃcient. This becomes more likely as
diﬀerentiation decreases. While the ﬁrst eﬀect is fairly obvious, the second is
less clear-cut and points to the inﬂuence of diﬀerentiation on D competition.
As b → 1 industry proﬁts “migrate” to U since the D section becomes more
competitive driving down proﬁts. The opposite occurs for VI which suﬀers from
a tougher competition in D and does not beneﬁt from any U proﬁt buﬀer since
it internally transfers the input at the marginal cost. In our duopoly scheme
IPJV is never socially eﬃcient since it introduces a sort of U collusion coupled
to double marginalization. This negative eﬀect has to be contrasted with the
wasteful duplication of ﬁxed costs associated to VI. The large areas of private
superiority of IPJV, even in the duopoly case, accounts for the observed diﬀusion
of Equity Joint Ventures along the vertical chain of production.
We conclude the duopoly case by investigating the proﬁtability of the two
vertical arrangements when ﬁrms compete à la Bertrand and we compare the
results with Cournot.
Consider the same linear inverse demand system, pi = a − qi − bqj. The
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So that aggregate proﬁts are ΠB
V I = 2
a2(1−b)
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Comparing the equilibrium values of the two vertical arrangements in the
two distinct market structures, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 2 Bertrand duopoly and comparisons
a) With Bertrand competition in the D market, if f = 0 IPJV is privately
preferred to VI as long as b ∈ [1
2,1).
b) IPJV under Bertrand competition yields larger D quantities, lower D









J ; industry proﬁts and consumer
surplus are higher under Bertrand.
Proof. a) Comparing the joint proﬁts under the two scenarios we ﬁnd that:
ΠB
J − ΠB =
(2b − 1)a2
2(b − 2)
2 (b + 1)
+ f.
Assume f = 0, ΠB
J − ΠB > 0 ⇐⇒ b > 1/2.
11As one can expect (Sing and Vives, 1984), the same scenario under quantity competition
leads to higher proﬁts, i.e. ΠC
V I > ΠB
V I.
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Discussion. The proﬁtability of IPJV vs VI increases when we go from a
Cournot to a Bertrand market structure regardless of the ﬁxed cost. In fact,
this form of joint venture is strictly preferred over VI when goods are suﬃciently
substitutable even in the absence of ﬁxed costs. The presence of positive ﬁxed
costs clearly reinforces the relative proﬁtability of IPJV. As for the comparison
of IPJV under the two natures of competition, with Bertand the D externality
aﬀects the distribution of proﬁts along the vertical chain making the U section
more proﬁtable and the D section less proﬁtable vis à vis Cournot. Nonetheless
Bertrand competition is able to make for larger industry proﬁts. This outcome
is due to the larger quantity produced that allows for higher U proﬁts which
overcompensate for the squeeze in D. As a result, in line with Singh and Vives
(1984), Bertrand competition is socially preferred to Cournot competition.12
3 Oligopoly
Here we extend and generalize the investigation conducted in the above section.
We consider an oligopoly where n ≥ 3 ﬁrms operate. The extension comes
from the analysis of mixed cases which were not contemplated in the duopoly
framework, and from the stance of the US Department of Justice quoted in the
introduction (Jacobson, 2007; p. 447). To this aim we go through the case
of a mixed market arrangement where vertically integrated (VI) ﬁrms compete
with non integrated ﬁrms which buy the essential input from an independent
producer serving all non integrated companies. As in the previous section, the
independent U producer, responsible for IPJV, is owned by non integrated ﬁrms
which are active in D.
Consider the linear inverse demand schedule pi = a−qi −b
￿
j =i qj. Again,
without loss of generality, we set the marginal cost of production of the essential
input z = 0.
12This is in contrast with Arya,et al. (2008) who maintain that the selling of input by a VI
ﬁrm to D competitors may reverse the standard social ranking of Cournot vs Bertrand.
9Now, we are able to extend the analysis to three distinct scenarios that we
study in turn. In the ﬁrst, all ﬁrms are VI, in the second, partial IPJV, some
ﬁrms are VI and others participate in the IPJV, while in the third all ﬁrms
participate in the IPJV and we have complete IPJV.
First, under complete VI we have n (symmetric) ﬁrms each comprising the U















iV I = p∗
V I =
a
2 + b(n − 1)
,
so that aggregate proﬁts are:
ΠV I = n
￿
a
2 + b(n − 1)
￿2
− nf > 0.
Second, we ﬁgure out partial IPJV with (n − k) D ﬁrms, competing with k
VI ﬁrms, while jointly owning the independent input producer which sets price
g. The D ﬁrms’ proﬁts are:
πiD = piqi − gqi,i = 1,...,n − k
while the VI ﬁrms’ proﬁts are:
πjV I = pjqj − f,j = n − k + 1,...,n












4 − 2b(1 − k)
(5)
Notice that the price set by the partial IPJV, gP, does not depend on the
total number of ﬁrms in the industry, n. It depends on the number of ﬁrms
adopting VI, i.e., k, as well as on b, the degree of product diﬀerentiation in
the D market. In particular, gP is decreasing in k and in b (the tougher the
competition in D, the lower the input price). These two eﬀects may be deemed
vertical externalities since they originate in D while their eﬀect extends to U
price setting.
10Remaining equilibrium magnitudes are:
pjV I =
a(b(k + n − 2) + 4)
2(b(n − 1) + 2)(b(k − 1) + 2)
,j = n − k + 1,...,n
πjV I =
a2 (b(k + n − 2) + 4)
2
4(b(k − 1) + 2)
2 (b(n − 1) + 2)




6 − b2 (n − 1) − b(5 − 2n − k)
￿
2(b(n − 1) + 2)(b(k − 1) + 2)
,i = 1,...,n − k
πiD =
a2
4(b(n − 1) + 2)
2,i = 1,...,n − k
πU =
(2 − b)(n − k)a2





b(k + 2n − 5) + b2 (1 − n) + 6
￿





where pjV I, πjV I and pi, πiD are the prices and proﬁts of the VI ﬁrms and of
the D ﬁrms, respectively; πpJ
cons = πiD + 1
n−kπU are the consolidated proﬁt of a
ﬁrm participating in the (partial) IPJV. Industry proﬁts are
ΠPJ =
a2(k2b2(n−b+bn+2)−k(3b2−12bn−b3+6b2n−3b2n2+b3n2−4)+n(b−2)2(bn−b+3))
4(bn−b+2)2(bk−b+2)2 −f (k + 1).
Under complete IPJV, the n D ﬁrms set up an Equity Joint Venture for the
joint input production (IPJV). The Equity Joint Venture is thus the unique
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(bn − b + 3)a2n
4(bn − b + 2)
2 − f.
Let us compare the diﬀerent market and vertical arrangements analyzed
above. We classify them according to the degree of downstream market com-
petition measured by b and n, since, as b and n increase, competition in D
11becomes tougher.13 To perform the comparison we split the feasible set of the
diﬀerentiation parameter b into distinct areas which depend on n.14 In what
follows we abstract from ﬁxed cost assuming f = 0 and we conﬁne to a partial
IPJV where a single VI ﬁrm competes with (n − 1) D ﬁrms owning the IPJV,
i.e., k = 1. These two assumptions simplify the analysis without compromising
the results and basic intuitions. Later on, we will discuss extensions to f > 0
and k > 1.
By comparing aggregate proﬁts in the three analyzed vertical arrangements,
we get the following thresholds:
ΠV I − ΠJ =
(−b(n−1)+1)a2n
4(bn−b+2)2 > 0 ⇐⇒ b <
1
n − 1
≡ bPJ (n) (6)
ΠV I − ΠPJ = (b2n−b2−4bn+4)(n−1)a2




n−1 ≡ bV I (n)
(7)
ΠJ − ΠPJ =
(bn−b−2)a2
16(bn−b+2) > 0 ⇐⇒ b >
2
(n − 1)
≡ bJ (n). (8)
From these comparisons we can derive the following:
Proposition 3 Private and social eﬃciency of complete IPJV, partial IPJV
and VI.





the private ranking is: VI ≻ partial IPJV ≻ complete IPJV;
b) For upper intermediate levels of product diﬀerentiation, i.e., b ∈
￿
bV I (n),bPJ (n)
￿
,
the private ranking is: partial IPJV ≻ VI ≻ complete IPJV;





the private ranking is: partial IPJV ≻ complete IPJV ≻ VI;
d) For low levels of product diﬀerentiation, i.e., b ∈ (bJ (n),1], the private
ranking is: complete IPJV ≻ partial IPJV ≻ VI.
e) As for the social welfare (SW) we have the following ranking: SWV I >
SWPJ > SW.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we plot (6), (7) and (8) in the plane (n,b) in
Figure 2 below. The upper solid line deﬁnes bJ (n), above which complete IPJV
is the preferred vertical arrangement. Notice that this threshold is meaningful,
i.e., lower than 1, only for n ≥ 4. The intermediate solid line deﬁnes bPJ (n),
above which partial IPJV is preferred to complete IPJV, which is better than
VI. Between bPJ (n) and the lower solid line which deﬁnes bV I (n), partial IPJV
is preferred to VI which is better than complete IPJV. Finally, between the hor-
izontal axis and the lower solid line, VI is preferred to partial IPJV which is
13As b increases, products become closer substitutes and the market size (the total quantity)
decreases. As for the number of ﬁrms, an increase in n, which also deﬁnes the number of
varieties, determines an increase of the market size (because of consumers’ love for variety);
however as ﬁrms’ proﬁts decrease with n, we take n as another measure of competition.
14As standard in the oligopoly literature, we treat n as a real number. Clearly, we will take
into account the integer problem when it is necessary.
12better than complete IPJV.










FIGURE 2: Comparisons between aggregate industry surpluses under VI,
partial and completeJIPV
As for social welfare ranking, straightforward calculations lead to:
SWV I =
a2(3 + b(n − 1))n
2(2 + b(n − 1))2
SWPJ =
a2(4(5 + 7n) + b(n − 1)(16 − 3b + 3(4 + b)n))
32(2 + b(n − 1))2
SWJ =
a2(7 + 3b(n − 1))n
8(2 + b(n − 1))2 .
whose ranking, SWV I > SWPJ > SW is independent of the values of n and b.
Discussion.
The above results emphasize the eﬀect of competition measured by b on
private (industry) preferences towards the vertical arrangements. As the degree
of product diﬀerentiation decreases ﬁrms prefer to switch from VI to some form
of IPJV (partial or complete). This result somewhat replicates and extends the
duopoly outcome seen above.15 However, in the present oligopoly framework
we are able to analyze also the eﬀect of n as well as the interaction between
n and b. As D competition gets ﬁercer with the number of ﬁrms, only high
levels of diﬀerentiation are able to preserve the private advantage of VI. On the
15In line with these ﬁndings, the extension to a Bertrand oligopoly which also implies a
more competitive D market structure increases the JIPV proﬁtability. The intuition is the
same as for the duopoly case.
13contrary, under IPJV the D ﬁrms are able to “shift” to U the proﬁt cancelled due
to tougher competition. With IPJV in U the D ﬁrms are able to compensate the
lost proﬁt in D with the monopoly proﬁt obtained by the single independent U
producer. If the market structure changes and a VI ﬁrm enters we have partial
IPJV. As a result, the U market becomes more contestable since the VI ﬁrm
makes its own input in-house and drives down the input demand faced by the
incumbent U ﬁrm. This translates into a lower g. Therefore, the entry of a VI
ﬁrm selling in D provides an automatic policing of the U market. This is an
external eﬀect and it occurs even if the VI company does not sell any input to
the rival D ﬁrms, which keep on buying the input from the IPJV.
The limitation of the analysis to zero ﬁxed costs is adopted for a neater
investigation of D market structure eﬀects (b, n) on the ranking of industry
preferences for the three distinct vertical arrangements. If we consider positive
ﬁxed cost the qualitative results obtained in the oligopoly market do not change
as far the eﬀects of b and n are concerned. Nonetheless, a positive f is going to
increase the likelihood of the adoption of IPJV, making this arrangement more
privately (and socially) desirable, since average ﬁxed costs for individual ﬁrms
go down with respect to the VI case. This eﬀect has been properly investigated
in Proposition (1). Extensions are straightforward.
Consider now the case of 1 < k < n. If k → n, the partial IPJV tends to
disappear as the market is made entirely by VI ﬁrms. Notice that the thresholds
bV I (n) and bJ(n), which deﬁne respectively the lower and the upper limit of
the area where partial IPJV is the preferred setting, now depend also on k.
Moreover, ∂bJ/∂k ≤ 0 as it can be easily veriﬁed. Further, as k increases, the
aggregate proﬁts of partial IPJV decrease, whereas those of VI do not change,
making for an indirect proof that ∂bV I/∂k > 0. Therefore, in the limit, k →
n, the interval
￿
bV I (n),bJ (n)
￿
would not exist anymore. In other words, as
the number of VI ﬁrms (k) in the partial IPJV conﬁguration increases, the
probability that partial IPJV is the most preferred setting vanishes.
Last but not the least, in most received literature RJV is deemed superior
because of internalization of spillovers, i.e., externalities. Here, we do not intro-
duce any external eﬀect in the input production. Nonetheless, if external eﬀects
were there they would add to the private beneﬁts of IPJV and have an impact
similar to the saving of ﬁxed costs that the IPJV implies. In all these cases we
may seem areas of social preference emerge beyond and above private eﬃciency.
4 Disengagement
In Proposition (3) we have analyzed industry preferences towards the three
vertical arrangements. However, one of the main faults of a Joint Venture
is its ability to last and survive despite the presence of incentives to leave it
and go alone or join other ventures. This problem is widely analyzed in the
managerial literature on Joint Ventures (Hewitt, 2008) and is usually framed as
a disengagement question.
The sort of disengagement we are going to consider is caused by the (indi-
14vidual) incentives ﬁrms have to move from one status (for instance VI or VS
with IPJV) to another.
To evaluate these incentives we have to compare individual proﬁts in the
diﬀerent statuses.
The analysis begins with the consideration of two extreme cases and subse-
quently goes to the intermediate.
4.1 Individual incentives
Consider ﬁrst the two extremes, VI and complete IPJV. As they are symmetric
situations, individual and aggregate preferences coincide. Therefore, we may
write:
π∗
iV I − π∗
iJ > 0 ⇐⇒ b < bPJ (n) (9)
where bPJ (n) is deﬁned in (6) and decreasing in n. From (9) we see that there
is an incentive for ﬁrms involved in IPJV to leave the joint venture and become
VI, provided b is suﬃciently low. This event becomes more likely the lower is
the number of ﬁrms in the market (as bPJ is decreasing in n). In other words,
the incentive to leave the IPJV plot is higher when the market is made by few
ﬁrms and/or the degree of diﬀerentiation is high (low b). In these circumstances
the IPJV turns out to be quite fragile and liable to fall apart due to private
incentive to disengage.16
The intermediate situation of partial IPJV has two types of actors, the VI
ﬁrm and the D ﬁrms owning the independent IPJV. Simple computations show
that the VI ﬁrm is worse oﬀ than the (n − 1) D ﬁrms if ﬁxed costs are high
enough. If we abstract from ﬁxed costs, the VI ﬁrm enjoys a variable cost
advantage (input price) with respect to the D ﬁrms. Therefore, it holds a
higher market share allowing for higher proﬁts.
If each ﬁrm in the IPJV adopts the VI arrangement, the advantage of the
existing VI ﬁrm (the nth ﬁrm in the market) fades away as the equation below
shows:
π∗
nV I − π∗
iV I =
(bn − b + 8)(n − 1)a2b
16(bn − b + 2)
2 > 0.
The above positive diﬀerence deﬁnes the loss of proﬁt of the existing VI ﬁrm
when remaining ﬁrms turn to VI.
As for the D ﬁrms, they gain from disengaging only in some areas of param-
eters b and n. To see this we compute the diﬀerence representing the incentive
to disengage of the D ﬁrms belonging to the IPJV plot. This diﬀerence is given
by the following:
π∗
iV I − π
∗pJ
icons = a2b2 (n − 1) + b(4 − 2n) + 2






(n−1) ≡ b1 (n). (10)
16These conclusions hold for zero ﬁxed costs. Strictly positive ﬁxed costs erode the incentives
to disengage from JIPV.
15From the comparison of individual incentives we obtain the following.
Lemma 4 i) For n = 3,4 and for suﬃciently low levels of substitutability, i.e.,
b < bV I (n), the D ﬁrms decide to leave the IPJV plot as they reap larger proﬁts
if they disengage and the VI ﬁrm has no incentive to stop them. For higher
levels of product substitutability, i.e., b > bV I (n), the D ﬁrms have again the
incentive to leave. However, disengagement may not occur since the existing
unique VI ﬁrm can prevent disengagement by compensating the D rival ﬁrms.
This is feasible since the loss of the VI would be higher than the gain the D ﬁrms
would get if they turn to VI.
ii) For n = 5,6... and for suﬃciently low levels of substitutability, i.e., 0 <
b < bV I (n), the D ﬁrms disengage. For bV I (n) < b < b1(n), the VI ﬁrm
can stop disengagement since the aggregate proﬁts of partial IPJV are larger
than those of complete VI. Finally for b1 (n) < b < 1 there is no incentive to
disengage.
Proof. We begin stating that
π∗
iV I − π
∗pJ
icons > 0 ⇐⇒ b2 (n − 1) + b(4 − 2n) + 2 > 0.









They are real numbers only for n > 4. Therefore, i) for n = 3,4 the diﬀerence
π∗
iV I − π
∗pJ
icons is strictly positive for all feasible b. In other words, each D ﬁrm
gains a positive surplus by disengaging from the partial IPJV. This occurs in
both cases, i.e., when each ﬁrm leaves the IPJV plot on an individual basis and
when all IPJV ﬁrms leave as a group.
ii) For n ≥ 5, the two roots are real. In particular b1 ∈ (0,1), while b2 ≥ 1,
and is not acceptable. Therefore, π∗
iV I − π
∗pJ
icons > 0 ⇐⇒ b < b1.










FIGURE 3: Ranges of b deﬁning the private incentive to disengage
Figure 3 depicts the thesholds deﬁned by (7) and (10) in the plane (n,b).
The solid upper line represents the frontier deﬁned by b1. Above the line there is
no incentive to disengage from IPJV, while below the incentive is nonnegative.
The solid lower line deﬁnes the frontier bV I (n). Below it, disengagement is
proﬁtable and feasible. Above it and below the the frontier, deﬁned by b1, the
VI ﬁrm could compensate the IPJV ﬁrms if they agree not to move, since the
loss the VI would bear in the case of disengagement would be larger than the
gain IPJV ﬁrms obtain.
4.2 Sorting the equilibria
From the above considerations and taking into account Lemma 4, we may derive
the following.
Proposition 5 Sorting Nash equilibria (NE)
For low levels of product market substitutability, i.e., b < bV I (n), the adop-
tion of VI by all ﬁrms is a NE. For high levels of product market substitutability,
i.e., b > bJ (n), the adoption of IPJV by all ﬁrms is a NE. For intermediate
levels of product substitutability partial IPJV turns out to be a NE if a mecha-
nism is set up whereby the VI ﬁrm(s) compensates the D ﬁrms in order to stop
them from disengaging and leaving the IPJV.
Proof. Looking at the aggregate industry proﬁts, we see that for b < bV I (n),
(lower solid line in Figure 3), VI is strictly better than partial IPJV, so that
the adoption of VI by all ﬁrms is a NE (there would not be any possibility for
the single VI ﬁrm of the partial IPJV conﬁguration to compensate the others
17not to disengage). Also for n ≥ 5 and b < b1 the D ﬁrms gain from the switch:
however only for bV I (n) < b < b1 there is the compensation incentive (the
diﬀerence between the proﬁt of the VI ﬁrm in the presence of disengagement
and the VI proﬁt without disengagement is larger than the diﬀerence between
the proﬁts of Ds with disengagement and those without disengagement). For
n ≥ 5 and bJ > b > b1 the D ﬁrms participating to the partial IPJV do not
have any incentive to disengage as π∗
iV I < π
∗pJ
icons: in this area the partial IPJV
is a NE. Finally, for b > bJ (n) > b1, aggregate proﬁts are higher with complete
IPJV, so that the D ﬁrms have the incentive and the possibility to persuade
the single VI ﬁrm to join the venture. The single VI ﬁrm would not have the
incentive to switch, unless compensated by D ﬁrms, since:















4(bn − b + 2)
and for k = 1
πnV I =
(bn − b + 4)
2 a2
16(bn − b + 2)
2.
These prove the existence of the Nash equilibria mentioned in Proposition 5.
Discussion. The wealth of Nash Equilibria proves the private eﬃciency
of IPJV in many circumstances and its ability to survive. However, the fact
that there are many areas of incentives to disengage and also some mechanism
that may sustain them points to the frequent divorces observed in many joint
ventures of all kinds, IPJV included.
5 Proﬁt volatility of VI and IPJV
A further question we address concerns the relative preference of the diﬀerent
vertical arrangements under uncertainty. Actually, an important rationale be-
hind many forms of joint ventures is risk sharing. We thus investigate the eﬀect
of uncertain market demands for the ﬁnal goods on IPJV desirability. The
answer may come from a simple extension to a triopoly framework with one
VI ﬁrm competing with the other two D ﬁrms which jointly own, on an equal
stake, an independent input producer (partial IPJV). We enrich the model by
the considerations of both Cournot and Bertand competition.
Consider the following inverse demand functions:
p1 = a − q1 − b(q2 + q3) + e
p2 = a − q2 − b(q1 + q3) + e (11)
p3 = a − q3 − b(q1 + q2) + e




We begin with Cournot competition. In this framework the D ﬁrms maximize
expected proﬁts selecting a quantity to which they will stick regardless of the
realization of the stochastic shock. This quantity is anticipated by U, which
chooses the proﬁt maximizing input price g. This price is deterministic. Given
the optimal g, D ﬁrms get realized proﬁts and prices which depend on the
stochastic shock. As usual, the VI ﬁrm just maximizes expected proﬁt of the
entire vertical chain of production. The set of equilibrium realized proﬁts is:
π1D = π2D =
a(a + 4(1 + b)e)
16(1 + b)2
πU =
a2 (2 − b)
8(1 + b)
πcons =
a(a + 4(1 + b)e)
16(1 + b)2 +





As it can be seen, only πU is certain, while π1D, π2D, πV I are aﬀected by
uncertainty. If we take expectations we see that all expected proﬁts are equal
to certainty proﬁts of the corresponding triopoly case. Therefore, the private
rankings do not change with respect to what seen above in the certainty case.
However, volatility is not irrelevant. If we compare the variance of πV I with








This means that the proﬁt volatility of the IPJV is lower than that of VI. This
result is due to the fact that the U joint venture is not aﬀected by uncertainty
and therefore its proﬁt provides a sort of cushion against risk also for D ﬁrms.
On the contrary the VI ﬁrm does not enjoy this chunk of sure proﬁt and therefore
shows higher volatility. IPJV does not generate an actual risk sharing along the
vertical chain, since the entire risk is faced by D ﬁrms while the U joint venture
is somehow isolated from risk.
A diﬀerent story can be told when ﬁrms compete à la Bertrand, while facing
the same kind of demand uncertainty. In that case the equilibrium proﬁts are:












As far as the diﬀerent level of volatility of the two arrangements are con-
cerned, we can write the following variances:
var(πV I) =
a2(−1+b)2(−2+(−3+b)b)2
16(1+b(3+b−2b2)2 σ2 < var(πcons) =
a2(−1+b)2(−3+(−4+b)b)2
16(1+b(3+b−2b2)2 σ2,
19from which it appears that the ranking of volatility under Bertrand competition
is reversed. In addition to that, the sharing of risk along the vertical chain in
the IPJV is now more balanced since both U and D proﬁts are aﬀected by σ2
and, therefore, they both contribute to the entire volatility of IPJV.
Taking into account all these considerations, we may write the following
result.
Proposition 6 Eﬀect of demand uncertainty on IPJV
Additive demand uncertainty does not change the ranking of private and so-
cial preference of IPJV in both Cournot and Bertrand competition with respect
to certainty. However, it does aﬀect the relative volatility of the two vertical
arrangements and risk sharing along the vertical chain: under Cournot com-
petition IPJV is less volatile than VI and the entire market risk is born by D
ﬁrms, while under Bertrand competition the IPJV is more volatile and there is
risk sharing between U and D ﬁrms.
Discussion. The above result underlies the importance of IPJV for risk
sharing along the vertical chain of production, regardless of the nature of com-
petition assumed in D. The fact that IPJV changes the distribution of risk
between U and D according to whether Bertrand or Cournot is adopted may
make one of the two market strategies preferred because of the risk allocation
that it produces.
6 Conclusions
In these pages we have analyzed the social and private desirability of Input
Production Joint Ventures (IPJV), which can be seen as an intermediate or-
ganizational setting lying between the two extremes of vertical integration and
vertical separation. As pointed out in the management literature, this form of
joint venture is widely adopted in many industries. Nonetheless, the theoretical
IO literature on this topic is surprisingly thin. Generally, production joint ven-
tures do not arise competitive concerns from antitrust authorities on the basis of
economies of scale and synergies. IPJV is deﬁnitely a form of partial collusion.
When compared to vertical integration, in some cases, IPJV turns out to be
privately desirable but ineﬃcient from a social welfare point of view, even if it
allows for savings in ﬁxed cost.
Our results are twofold. We provide a ﬁrst theoretical model for the analysis
and show that IPJV may be privately preferred to vertical integration even in the
absence of wasteful duplication of ﬁxed costs: ﬁrms’ incentives to form a IPJV
increase with the degree of downstream market competition. We characterize
the conditions under which IPJV is privately optimal and argue that ﬁrms’
incentives may be welfare detrimental. Finally, we provide a rationale for the
empirical relevance of IPJV both in terms of its ability to survive and in terms
of disengagement incentives. To this purpose we investigate market structures
where ﬁrms doing IPJV compete with vertically integrated rivals. We ﬁnd that,
if product market substitutability is low, there may be an incentive for ﬁrms
20doing IPJV to leave and turn to vertical integration. However, this incentive
could be eﬃciently neutralized via a transfer mechanism whereby incumbent
vertically integrated ﬁrms compensate IPJV members to stay in. Our emphasis
on disengagement is due to the high rate of divorces among ﬁrms joining IPJV
(Hewitt, 2008).
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